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CERCLA's Innocent Landowner Defense: The
Rising Standard of Environmental Due
Diligence For Real Estate Transactions
I. INTRODUCTION
The anxiety that erupted when environmental contamination was
discovered at Love Canal in 1979 continues to pervade the public's
heightened environmental awareness.' Congress quickly responded to
the Love Canal disaster by enacting the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation And Liability Act2 (CERCLA) in 1980.1 In
passing CERCLA (commonly known as the Superfund Act), Congress
envisioned two main goals: (1) to expedite the cleanup of abandoned
hazardous waste sites, and (2) to insure that those responsible for creat-
ing the hazardous conditions would bear the costs of such cleanup.'
With the enactment of CERCLA, Congress created an innovative
scheme to finance the elimination of inactive hazardous waste sites across
the nation. Though subjected to much commentary' and some modifica-
1. See Silverman, Love Canal.' A Retrospective, 20 [Current Developments] Env't. Rep. (BNA)
835 (September 15, 1989) (Love Canal has come to "symbolize corporate responsibility, government
myopia, and the high human and environmental costs of living in an industrial society."); Schroeder,
Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 495 (1986). A Harris Poll conducted in 1983 indicated
that over 80 percent of Americans opposed any weakening of environmental standards. Id. at 505 n.
38. See also, Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should Superfund Liability Be Abolished?, 6 STAN.
ENv. L. 271, 279 n.10 (1987) ("There is a relatively strong political consensus that the problem of
hazardous waste pollution should be effectively attacked by governmental action."). For a discus-
sion of the "new environmental liability" of the 1980s which has accompanied the public's environ-
mental awareness, see Abraham, Environmental Liability And The Limits Of Insurance, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 942 (1988).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, And Liability Act, 94 STAT 2767
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988)) (CERCLA).
3. For a discussion of the short and long-term effects of Love Canal, see Silverman, supra note 1,
at 835 (It "was Love Canal that prompted the passage of CERCLA and raised the consciousness of
the nation about the dangers of hazardous waste.").
4. See 126 CONG. REc. 30932 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); Note, Superfund Settlements:
The Failed Promise of'the 1986 Amendments, 74 VA. L. REv. 123 (1988) [hereinafter Note,
Superfund Settlements].
5. See, eg. Note, Superfund Settlements, supra note 4, at 123 (arguing that inadequate re-
sources, ineptness of the Government's administration, and the number of significant unresolved
problems are obstacles to CERCLA's effectiveness in solving the problem of environmental contami-
nation at inactive hazardous waste sites); Lyons, supra note 1.
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tion,6 the CERCLA regime7 has had a substantial impact on the conduct
of purchasers of commercial real property.' CERCLA imposes broad
liability upon the current owner of the property for hazardous waste site
cleanup costs incurred by the federal Government. 9 The ability of inno-
cent landowners10 to avoid this extensive and costly environmental liabil-
ity is currently evolving into a rigorous standard of "environmental due
diligence" for the purchaser of commercial real estate."
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 2 (SARA) of
1986 incorporated a narrow "innocent landowner defense" into CER-
CLA.'3 The defense requires purchasers to make "all appropriate in-
quiry' 14  into the environmental condition of a property before
acquisition to avoid CERCLA liability. This emerging obligation of en-
vironmental inquiry is altering the structure of commercial real estate
transactions in daily practice.' 5
The scope of the inquiry requirement arising from the innocent
landowner defense is not specified by CERCLA, nor have the few courts
ruling directly upon this issue provided any definition of inquiry beyond
the statutory standard of commercial reasonableness. 16 The Guidance
Memorandum,' 7 issued by the United States Environmental Protection
6. In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657 (1988) (SARA), which amended various sections of CERCLA.
7. By the "CERCLA regime" I am referring to the original legislation of 1980 incorporated
with SARA of 1986.
8. See Silverman, supra note 1, at 85; Schwenke, Environmental Liabilities Imposed On Land-
owners, Tenants, and Lenders---How Far Can And Should They Extend? An Overview of Issues Of
Landowner And Lender Liabilities, 18 Envt'l. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 1036 (1988); Hitt, Desperately
Seeking SARA: Preserving the Innocent Landowner Defense to Superfund Liability, 18 REAL EST.
L.. 3, at 2-3 (1989) (An environmental audit of the property is critically important for parties
seeking to escape CERCLA liability.).
9. See infra notes 36-83 and accompanying text.
10. "Innocent landowners" include those persons, whether individual or corporate, who acquire
property through various types of conveyances after hazardous wastes have been disposed of on or at
jhe property and who did not participate in any way in the management, generation, transportation,
or storage of such wastes at the property. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C §§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3).
11. See Bennett, Environmental Due Diligence: An Evolving National Standard, 52 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 1369 (1989) ("While it is unreasonable to expect that any due diligence standard could
protect against every possible environmental risk, it is becoming possible to set a benchmark stan-
dard."). See also Comment, The Environmental Due Diligence Defense And Contractual Protection
Devices, 49 LA. L. REv. 1405 (1989).
12. SARA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
13. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3) (1988).
14. Id. at § 9601(35)(B).
15. See infra notes 126-43 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 94-125 and accompanying text.
17. Guidance On Landowner Liability Under § 107(a)(1) and De Minimis Settlements Under
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Agency (EPA) in 1988, concerns CERCLA settlement procedures for
innocent landowners but fails to further clarify the uncertain obligation
of purchasers to investigate the environmental condition of property ac-
quisitions.11 In response to this uncertainty, a proposed Amendment19 to
CERCLA clarifies the inquiry obligation beyond the vague reasonable-
ness standard of CERCLA by mandating the performance of a profes-
sional environmental assessment for every commercial property
acquisition.2°
This Comment discusses the emerging requirement of environmen-
tal due diligence in terms of establishing a new standard for real property
transactions. Part II provides a brief explanation of the CERCLA liabil-
ity regime. In Part III, the innocent landowner defense, including its
interpretation by the courts, is evaluated as the source of environmental
due diligence. The Comment then analyzes the proposed Amendment
and EPA's Guidance Memorandum in terms of raising the standard of
due diligence for all commercial property transactions.
This Comment proposes that the Amendment should be incorpo-
rated into CERCLA in order to provide legal certainty to the rising obli-
gation of environmental due diligence. The innocent landowner defense
and its concurrent responsibility of due diligence are mechanisms which
generate environmental information essential to the CERCLA enforce-
ment process and the efficient elimination of risks posed by abandoned
hazardous waste sites. Statutory specification of environmental due dili-
gence lowers the costs of the obligation, thereby facilitating its incorpora-
tion into every commercial real estate transaction. The proposed
Amendment accomplishes this task and transforms environmental due
diligence into a positive statutory duty which provides benefits to both
the real estate industry and society.2
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND: CERCLA'S LIABILITY REGIME
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to respond to public concern
§ 122(g)(1)(B) of CERCLA, and Settlements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property,
reprinted in 41 [Federal Laws Index] Env't Rep. (BNA), 3501 (June 6, 1989) [hereinafter Guidance].
18. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
19. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. E2367-68 (1989).
20. See id See also, infra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
21. CERCLA expires in October 1991. In order to avoid the year-long reauthorization period
of SARA, interested entities are "already preparing for a spirited battle over the form and substance
of the Superfund program." Leifer & Musiker, Cleaning Up Superfund: -0 Changes To Make Dur-
ing Reauthorization, 21 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 915 (1490). Ironically, three of
the ten recommendations made by these commentators involve innocent landowner liability. Id.
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with health and environmental risks posed by inactive hazardous waste
sites.22 Originally CERCLA created a 1.6 billion dollar trust fund, com-
monly referred to as the "Superfund," which continues to be funded by
excise taxes on the chemical and petroleum industries. The Superfund is
used to finance federal cleanup efforts.23 The 1986 SARA Amendments
provided for a significant increase to the Superfund after the Government
perceived the enormity of the cleanup task.24
Under CERCLA the federal Government, acting through EPA, is
empowered to respond immediately to hazardous substance sources
which threaten the environment and public health without having to first
determine liability.25 Liability for the response action's costs is then es-
tablished after the Government has acted to remove the threat.26 Over-
all, CERCLA is a remedial rather than a regulatory statute whereby the
"Government generally undertakes pollution abatement, and polluters
pay for such abatement through tax and reimbursement liability."27 The
entire CERCLA process-identification of sites requiring a response ac-
tion, site analysis, cleanup of sites which individually possess unique
technical problems,2" and recovery of expenditures from identifiable re-
sponsible parties-is extremely costly in terms of actual and transac-
tional expenses.29 This situation reaches exigent proportions in light of
22. See Silverman, supra note 1, at 835.
23. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9611; see also, Note, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses
Left?, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 385 (1988).
24. SARA established the Hazardous Substance Superfund to finance the Government's re-
sponse actions under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9507. "The Superfund's funding sources include gen-
eral revenue appropriations, certain environmental taxes, monies recoverable under CERCLA on
behalf of the Superfund, and CERCLA-authorized penalties and punitive damages." United States
v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1500 (6th. Cir. 1989). SARA also effected a broader based
apportionment of costs among private entities. See, Note, Misery Loves Company: Spreading the
Costs of CERCLA Cleanup, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1469, 1471-72 (1989).
25. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9607(a). While government response and recovery ap-
pears to be the traditional and most common method of responding to hazardous substances re-
leases, CERCLA also provides for two alternative methods for recovery of CERCLA response costs.
First, EPA can order the potentially responsible parties (PRPs) to clean up the site (42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(a)). Second, third parties can carry out the cleanup and recover their costs against responsi-
ble parties under a private cause of action (42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9612). See Aliffv. Joy, 914 F.2d.
39 (4th Cir. 1990); Reardon v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 558, 561 (D. Mass. 1990).
26. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. In addition, 9607(1) provides for the creation of a federal lien
on a property where the United States has spent funds cleaning up hazardous substances at such
property. Reardon v. United States, 731 F. Supp. at 562 (D. Mass. 1990).
27. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985).
28. See Note, Superfund Settlements, supra note 4, at 124 (noting that the problem of uncon-
trolled hazardous waste sites is compounded by the tremendous technical problems in analysis and
cleanup of each site).
29. In general, transaction costs can be defined as the "'costs of reaching agreement with an-
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Government analysts' estimations that approximately 1,500 to 10,000
sites with individual cleanup costs ranging from 10 to 100 billion dollars
currently exist across the nation.3 °
A. Elements of CERCLA Liability
1. Identification of Potentially Responsible Parties. CERCLA
§ 107 provides for liability for the Government's "response costs"'3 1
other party."' In the CERCLA context, the agreement among the PRPs concerning the allocation
of cleanup costs may be reached voluntarily through settlement or involuntarily through adjudica-
tion. The transaction costs of "imposing liability on and allocating financial responsibility" among
PRPs connected with the worst sites are enormous and were estimated to be 8 billion dollars,
equivalent to the cost of cleaning up 400-450 sites, in 1985. In addition, these transaction costs result
in high opportunity costs, i.e. "costs resulting from opportunities foregone when resources are allo-
cated to one particular use instead of another." Specifically, the opportunity costs in this context are
the foregone environmental uses of the funds to cleanup additional sites. Overall, the transaction
and opportunity costs "arising from the CERCLA enforcement process warrant concern and scru-
tiny." Lyons, supra note 1, at 272-73.
30. See Superfund Settlements, supra note 4, at 124.
31. Response costs include two types of activities under CERCLA: "removal" activities (short-
term responses) and "remedial" activities (long-term responses) (42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), 9601(24)).
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (23) provides:
"[R]emove" or "removal" means the cleanup or removal of released hazardous sub-
stances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the
threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be
necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous
sub, ':nces, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may
be r cessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or
to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The
term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security fencing or other measures
to limit access, provision of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and hous-
ing of threatened individuals not otherwise provided for.
Section 9601(24) provides:
"[R]emedy" or "remedial action" means those actions consistent with permanent rem-
edy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or mini-
mize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial
danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment. The term in-
cludes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the release as storage, con-
finement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover,
neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated contaminated
materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes,
dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of
leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision of alternative water sup-
plies, and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the
public health and welfare and the environment. The term includes the costs permanent
relocation of residence and business and community facilities where the President deter-
mines that, alone or in combination with other measures, such relocation is more cost-
effective than and environmentally preferable to the transportation, storage, treatment,
destruction, or secure disposition oflsite of hazardous substances, or may otherwise be
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among four potentially responsible parties (PRPs):
(1) "the owner and operator of a vessel or facility";
(2) "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which hazardous
wastes were disposed of";
(3) generators of hazardous waste who arrange for the disposal or
treatment of such waste; and
(4) transporters of hazardous waste.32
The liability provision of CERCLA pertinent to the innocent land-
owner is § 107(a)(1): the "owner ' 33 of a facility34 is liable for the costs of
cleaning up the hazardous substances released at the property. "Owner"
necessary to protect the public health or welfare; the term includes offsite transport and
offsite storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition of hazardous substances and
associated contaminated materials.
32. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1988). The statutory language specifically provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses
set forth in subsection (b) of this section
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated
any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment,
or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous sub-
stances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances,
and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or
treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous sub-
stance, shall be liable for
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or
a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with
the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the rea-
sonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a
release.
Id.
33. CERCLA defines an "owner" as: "(ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facil-
ity, any person owning or operating such facility." (42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii)).
34. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) defines a "facility" as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe
into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment,
ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site
or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed,
or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in con-
sumer use or any vessel.
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is defined broadly and circularly under CERCLA;35 however, the statute
provides for a narrow exemption from liability where the ownership in-
terest in the property is a security interest.36
In the leading case of New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,37 the Second
Circuit broadly construed CERCLA § 107(a)(1) to cover current owners
who neither owned the property at the time of hazardous waste disposal,
nor caused the presence or release of such waste at the property.38 The
court refused to limit the application of § 107(a)(1) only to persons who
owned the property "at the time of disposal. ' 39 Instead, the court held
that a current owner is liable for response costs under § 107(a)(1) with-
out regard to her connection with the disposal of the hazardous sub-
stances at the property because CERCLA § 107(a)(1) "unequivocally
imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facility from which there
is a release or threat of release, without regard to causation."'
The Shore court supported its interpretation of "owner" based on
CERCLA's structure and legislative history.41 Interpreting § 107(1)(a)
to include a causation requirement would have negated the affirmative
defenses provided in § 107(b).42 Congress' specific rejection of a causa-
tion requirement in § 107(a) further supported the court's holding that
current owners were liable "without reference to whether they caused or
contributed to the release."'4 3 Thus, the court closed what could have
become a "loophole in CERCLA's coverage" by refusing to allow cur-
rent landowners to claim an exemption from liability and thereby frus-
trate Government reimbursement of response costs where the other
responsible parties are nonexistent or judgment-proof.4
Courts ruling on the issue of owner liability under CERCLA
35. "The CERCLA definition of 'owner', is not, however, coextensive with all possible uses of
that term; it specifically excludes 'a person who without participating in the management of a facil-
ity, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the facility." In re Bergsoe
Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1989). See, CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). Thus, secured
creditors who do not participate in the management of the facility are exempted from CERCLA
liability as nonowners. Id. See also, United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (1lth Cir.
1990).
36. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990). See also, supra
notes 33 and 35 and accompanying text.
37. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
38. Id. at 1043.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1044.
41. Id. at 1044-45.
42. Id. at 1044.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1045.
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§ 107(1)(a) subsequent to Shore have unanimously accepted the Second
Circuit's interpretation of the statutory provision.4" In Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co.,' the Supreme Court's dicta stated that "two general
terms... describe those who may be liable under CERCLA... : 'per-
sons' and 'owners or operators.' ""4 The Court ultimately held that
Pennsylvania could be liable under CERCLA as an owner where the
State owned easements at the site and hazardous substances were discov-
ered during the State's flood control activities.48 The Supreme Court fol-
lowed CERCLA precedent in ruling that an entity is liable for CERCLA
costs solely as the current owner without any involvement in the past
disposal of hazardous waste at the site.49
2. Application of the Strict Liability Standard. The liability im-
posed on a PRP under CERCLA is retroactive, strict, and joint and sev-
eral.5 The Circuit Courts uniformly have rejected challenges to
CERCLA based on the statute's retroactive application."1 Application of
the strict liability standard is based on the reference in CERCLA
§ 101(32)52 to § 311 of the Clean Water Act which provides for strict
liability. 3 In short, if an individual is a PRP under CERCLA § 107(a),
she is responsible for cleanup costs regardless of any fault in connection
with the disposal or improper storage of hazardous substances at the con-
taminated property.5 4
45. See, eg., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 889 F.2d 1146, 1151 (1st Cir.
1989) ("[Clurrent owners, former owners, generators, or transporters, may be held liable if there is a
release or threatened release of hazardous substances from the relevant facility.") (citing Shore);
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 89 (3rd Cir. 1988); Reardon v.
United States, 731 F. Supp. 558, 561 (D. Mass. 1990); United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot,
Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341, 1346 (D. Idaho 1989); United States v. Serafini, 706 F. Supp. 346, 350
(M.D. Pa. 1988); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (A
"party need not be both an owner and operator to incur liability" under § 107(a)(1)).
46. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
47. Id. at 2277.
48. Id. at 2280.
49. Id. at 2278.
50. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceuticals & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734-37 (8th Cir.
1989) (CERCLA applies retroactively); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d
Cir. 1985) (responsible parties strictly liable under CERCLA); United States v. Chem.Dyne Corp.,
573 F. Supp. 802, 805-10 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (joint and several liability governs CERCLA actions).
51. See, eg., Northeastern Pharmaceuticals & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 734-37 (8th Cir. 1989).
52. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) provides: "[L]iable" or "liability" under this subchapter
shall be construed to be the standard of liability which obtains under section 1321 of Title 33.
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1321. See, Note, Liabilities of the Innocent Current Owner of Toxic Property
Under CERCLA, 23 U. RICH. L. REv. 403, 411-23 and nn. 61 & 62 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Liabil-
ities of the Innocent Current Owner].
54. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988) ("We agree with the
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For purposes of CERCLA liability, no causation nexus is required
between the PRP's conduct and the release of hazardous substances.55
In Shore, the corporate developer acquired the commercial property
which was the subject of the litigation on October 13, 1983. Within the
next three months, Shore's tenants added 90,000 gallons of hazardous
chemicals to the site's storage tanks without the owner's authorization or
knowledge until their eviction on January 5, 1984.6 The court held that
the developer, as the owner of real property containing a hazardous
waste site, is strictly liable under CERCLA § 107(a)(1) for the Govern-
ment's response costs.5 7  According to the court, Congress' intention to
hold PRPs strictly liable is manifested in CERCLA § 101(32)'s reference
to such standard of liability under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321. Furthermore, strict liability appropriately governs CERCLA en-
forcement actions because CERCLA is a remedial, rather than a fault-
based or regulatory statute. 8
Lenders who hold a mortgage on a property and later acquire title
to the property through foreclosure also may be strictly liable as owners
for CERCLA response costs.5 9 Lenders especially are confronted with
serious liability in such scenarios. If contamination is discovered at the
property prior to foreclosure, the lender must choose to either write off
the loan for worthless collateral or pay for the Government's response
costs as the owner of the foreclosed property." In contrast, the potential
landowner has an opportunity to discover contamination prior to the
purchase and may choose to forego the transaction completely.61
Strict liability is an integral part of the CERCLA regime because the
overwhelming body of precedent that has interpreted § 107(a) as establishing a strict liability
scheme.").
55. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 at 1043.
56. Id. at 1039.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 1041, 1044.
59. See United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (Bank
which formerly held mortgage on parcel of land, later purchased the land at a foreclosure sale and
continued to own it was responsible for the cost of hazardous waste cleanup.).
60. In response to Maryland Bank & Trust, supra note 61, legislation was introduced in Con-
gress by Representative John J. LaFalce (D. NY) which is "designed to insulate.., lending institu-
tions" and fiduciaries from inappropriate Superfund liability when they foreclose on property which
turns out to be contaminated." 136 CONG. REc. E1023 (1990) (remarks of Rep. LaFalce); See H.R.
4494, 136 CONG. Rnc. E1023, E1024. For a discussion of lenders' responses to the threat of CER-
CLA liability, see, O'Brien, News Analysis. and Perspective, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) 169 (1989).
61. In addition, lenders' environmental liability exposure may be multiplied in the event that
secondary mortgage purchasers require lenders to repurchase loans secured by environmentally con-
taminated real estate. 19 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 14 (1988).
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courts have uniformly followed Shore's lead in this respect.62 Overall,
the innocent landowner is responsible for cleanup costs recoverable
under CERCLA even though the landowner has no connection with the
past waste disposal activities at the property.
3. Imposition of Joint and Several Liability. CERCLA's extensive
liability further threatens innocent landowners with enormous risks in
property transactions because of judicial imposition of joint and several
liability.63 As provided in the Restatement (Second) of Torts," joint and
several liability is particularly appropriate to the Government's prosecu-
tion of a CERCLA reimbursement action because such liability ensures
"complete cost recovery. ' 65 At most sites, it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to apportion the extent of each party's contribution to the
environmental contamination.66 Under joint and several liability, the
Government may lighten its prosecutorial burden by selecting a few deep
pockets or easily identifiable parties, such as the current owner, from
whom to seek recovery of response costs. 67
SARA did not change CERCLA's broad liability provisions but ex-
62. See, eg., Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882 F.2d 392, 394(9th Cir. 1989) ("CERCLA gener-
ally imposes strict liability on owners and operators of facilities at which hazardous substances were
disposed.") (citing Shore); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989)
("CERCLA contemplates strict liability for landowners who, absent a defense under § 9607(b), are
deemed responsible for some of the harm."); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir.
1988).
63. While the courts have stated that CERCLA's legislative history indicates that joint and
several liability under § 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, governs CERCLA actions,
CERCLA does not explicitly specify how courts should apportion costs in particular cases. See
Leifer & Musiker, supra note 21.
64. RE ATE MENT (SECOND) OF TorS § 433(A) (Defendants are jointly and severally liable
when the harm is "indivisible."). A PRP in a CERCLA action may avoid joint and several liability
by proving that the "harm is divisible and there is a reasonable basis for apportionment of damages."
United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (D. Ohio 1983).
65. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174 (3rd Cir. 1988). The leading case con-
cerning the majority view of joint and several liability under CERCLA is United States v. Chem-
Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810 (D. Ohio 1983) ("Where two or more persons cause a single and indivisi-
ble harm, each is subject to liability for the entire harm."). See also O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176,
178 (1st Cir. 1989) ("It is now well settled that Congress intended that the federal courts develop a
uniform approach governing the use of joint and several liability in CERCLA actions.").
66. See Note, Liabilities of the Innocent Current Owner, supra note 59, at 417. The task of
apportionment becomes even more complicated when many generators have deposited hazardous
substances at the property, several owners have exercised different levels of care or the hazardous
substances have intermingled in one area.
67. Id. at 418. A minority of courts employ a more equitable apportionment of liability speci-
fied in the proposed "Gore Amendment" to CERCLA. For example, in United States v. A & F
Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984), the court in its discretion applied the equitable
factors specified in the Gore Amendment, including the degree of care exercised by a PRP and the
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plicitly allows for a right of contribution among the PRPs6 s The land-
owner thus may implead other parties into the Government's action to
recover response costs 9 In resolving contribution claims, a court may
allocate response costs among liable parties according to equitable fac-
tors which it determines are appropriate. 7' Although a PRP cannot con-
tract out of its liability with the federal Government, parties to a real
estate transaction prospectively may provide for a right of contribution
in structuring the transaction.71 For instance, in Mardan Corp. v. CGC
Music, Inc. ,72 the court dismissed the purchaser's action to recover CER-
CLA costs against the preceding landowner because the purchaser had
signed a Settlement Agreement and Release with the seller.7' However,
the contribution claim must rely on explicit language concerning the par-
ties' environmental liabilities; an "as-is" clause in a contract of sale does
not defeat the current landowner's claim against its predecessor for
CERCLA costs.74
III. THE SOURCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DILIGENCE:
CERCLA'S INNOCENT LANDOWNER DEFENSE
In Shore, the Second Circuit stated that strict liability under CER-
CLA was "not absolute, but limited by certain defenses for causation. '75
The third-party defense76 of CERCLA, which involves hazardous sub-
PRP's relative contribution to the hazardous waste in terms of amount and toxicity, among other
criteria. Note, Liabilities of the Innocent Current Owner, supra note 52, at 419.
68. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). See also Dubuc & Evans, Recent Developments Under
CERCLA: Toward a More Equitable Distribution of Liability, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10197 (1987) (discussing SARA's right of contribution as easing "some of the unfairness of joint and
several liability."). Id. at 10200.
69. CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). See also Note, Liabilities of the Innocent Current Owner,
supra note 53, at 420.
70. See Smith Land and Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90 (3rd Cir. 1988)
("[U]nder CERCLA the doctrine of caveat emptor is not a defense to liability for contribution but
may only be considered in mitigation of the amount due."); In re Sterling Steel Treating, Inc. 94
Bankr. 924 (E.D. Mi. 1988).
71. See Dubuc & Evans, supra note 68, at 10200-02.
72. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
73. Id. at 1454.
74. See Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626 (D.N.J. 1990); International Clinical Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Stevens, 710 F. Supp. 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
75. 759 F.2d 1032, 1042. See, CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
76. CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of
release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely
by:
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stance releases caused solely by the acts or omissions of a third party, is a
substitute for causation in other tort contexts." According to one com-
mentator, the third-party defense completes what is merely a shift of the
burden of proof of causation from the plaintiff to the defendant.""8
The innocent landowner defense arises from the interplay of CER-
CLA § 107(b)(3), the third-party defense,7 9 and CERCLA § 101(35), the
application of the defense to innocent landowners.80 These two provi-
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant,
or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relation-
ship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where the sole contrac-
tual arrangement rises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a
common carrier by rail), if the defendant established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance con-
cerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in
light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against fore-
seeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions.
77. Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARe. L. REV. 1458, 1544 (1986)
[hereinafter Developments]. See also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 ("Inter-
preting § 9607(a) as including a causation requirement makes superfluous the affirmative defenses
provided in § 9607(b), each of which carves out from liability an exception based on causation.");
United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 170 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Section 107(b)(3) sets forth a limited
affirmative defense based on the complete absence of causation."). For the related discussion of the
difficulties of proof for the plaintiff in toxic tort litigation, see Gara, Medical Surveillance Damages:
Using Common Sense and the Common Law to Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental
Hazards, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 265 (1988).
78. Developments, supra note 77, at 1544. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160,
169-70 (burden of disproving causation is placed on the defendant who "profited from the generation
and inexpensive disposal of hazardous waste.").
79. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3); see supra note 76.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) provides:
(35)(A) The term "contractual relationship", for the purpose of section 9607(b)(3) of
this title, includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instru-
ments transferring title or possession, unless the real property on which the
facility concerned is located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or
placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more
of the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know
and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the
subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the
facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by es-
cheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through
the exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest. In addition
to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he has satis-
fied the requirements of § 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of this title.
(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in clause (i)
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sions establish an exemption from CERCLA liability for landowners
who acquire a property after the disposal of hazardous wastes without
any knowledge of its environmental contamination. To prove a lack of
knowledge, the landowner must have made all appropriate inquiry into
the environmental condition of the property before acquisition.8' In ad-
dition, the innocent landowner must fulfilf the requirements of CER-
CLA's third-party defense: first, that the environmental contamination
was caused solely by a third party's acts or omissions; and second, that
the landowner exercised due care and took reasonable precautions
against any foreseeable acts by the third party under all the circum-
stances.2 Overall, these factual proofs impose a substantial burden on
the landowner who attempts to escape CERCLA liability by claiming the
innocent landowner defense.
Through the enactment of the innocent landowner defense, Con-
gress responded to public concern with the inequity of CERCLA's nar-
row third-party defense.83 Congress clarified § 107(b)(3) by defining the
term "contractual relationship" for purposes of the newly created inno-
cent landowner defense.84 Any instrument transferring title or posses-
of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have undertaken, at
the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and
uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in
an effort to minimize liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the court
shall take into account any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of
the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property
if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information
about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of con-
tamination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by ap-
propriate inspection.
(C) Nothing in this paragraph or in § 9607(b)(3) of this title shall diminish the lia-
bility of any previous owner or operator of such facility who would otherwise be
liable under this chapter. Notwithstanding this paragraph, if the defendant ob-
tained actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance at such facility when the defendant owned the real property and then
subsequently transferred ownership of the property to another person without
disclosing such knowledge, such defendant shall be treated as liable under
§ 9607(a)(1) of this title and no defense under § 9607(b)(3) of this title shall be
available to such defendant.
(D) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the liability under this chapter of a de-
fendant who, by any act or omission, caused or contributed to the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance which is the subject of the action
relating to the facility.
81. See United States v. Serafini, 706 F. Supp. 346 (M.D.Pa. 1986).
82. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
83. See 131 CONG. REc. HI 1158-59 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statements of Reps. Breaux, Frank
and Moakley).
84. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A). For a discussion concerning the issue of whether a
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sion of real property is a "contractual relationship" under CERCLA
which ordinarily bars the use of the third-party defense."5 However, an
innocent landowner may void her contractual relationship with the for-
mer owner if she proves that at the time of acquisition, she had "no rea-
son to know" that hazardous substances were disposed of at the property
because she had conducted a pre-acquisition inquiry consistent with
"good commercial practice" which failed to reveal the presence of envi-
ronmental contamination on the property.86
While the real estate industry's reactions to the innocent landowner
defense have been frequent and vociferous,87 few courts have directly
construed the defense.88 Generally two issues arise when defendants as-
sert the defense: (1) the scope of the term "contractual relationship"
under CERCLA § 101(35)(A); and (2) the scope of the constructive
knowledge and all appropriate inquiry components of the defense.
Courts have liberally applied the broad definition of "contractual
relationship" under the innocent landowner defense. In Westwood
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas,8 9 the court held that a deed
executed between the purchaser and the seller is a contractual relation-
ship under CERCLA § 101(35)(A).90 However, the court allowed the
seller to claim the third-party defense to prove that the purchaser's acts
which caused a release at the site were not undertaken " 'in connection
with'" the contractual relationship since the purchaser had engaged in
new construction activities at the site. 91 The court in United States v.
Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. 92 also held that a contractual relationship
under CERCLA § 101(35)(A) was established where the individual de-
deed or other conveyance constituted a "contractual relationship" before SARA's enactment, see
Hitt, supra note 8, at 14-15.
85. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)(3).
86. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9601(35)(B).
87. See generally Hitt, supra note 8; Schwenke, supra note 8; Anderson, Will The Meek Even
Want The Earth? 38 MERCER L. REV. 535 (1987).
88. To date, the following courts have had occasion to construe the innocent landowner defense:
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); Westwood Pharmaceuticals v. Na-
tional Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); International Clinical Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Stevens, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3685 (1990); United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur
Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989); International Clinical Laboratories, Inc. v. Stevens,
710 F. Supp. 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5-301 (C.D. Ca. 1989); United States v. Serafini, 706 F. Supp. 346 (M. Pa. 1988); In re
Sterling Steel Treating, Inc., 94 Bankr. 924 (E.D. Mi. 1988); Washington v. Time Oil, Inc., 687 F.
Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
89. 737 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
90. Id. at 1286.
91. Id. See also CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
92. 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989).
[Vol. 38
1990] CERCLA'S INNOCENT LANDOWNER DEFENSE 841
fendants received interests in the property through a stock-transfer and
quitclaim deed.93
In contrast, the courts' interpretation of constructive knowledge and
appropriate inquiry under the innocent landowner defense according to a
standard of reasonableness does not provide certainty to efforts to com-
ply with the defense. Moreover, this case-by-case approach results in
disparate treatment of current landowners, thereby compounding the
problem of uncertainty.
In United States v. Serafini,94 the Government brought a CERCLA
action for recovery of response costs against the current owners of a pre-
viously contaminated landfill. The defendants had formed a partnership
for commercial development purposes and in 1969 purchased the site at
issue.95 In 1983 EPA conducted an emergency removal at the site which
contained approximately 1,141 fifty-five gallon drums scattered through-
out the property.96 The defendants in Serafini raised CERCLA's inno-
cent landowner defense in opposition to the Government's motion for
summary judgment. 97 Although the district court found that the Gov-
ernment established a prima facie case for liability under CERCLA, the
court held that issues of fact remained whether the defendants had un-
dertaken "all appropriate inquiry... consistent with good commercial or
customary practice" as required by the statutory defense.9
The current landowners in Serafini admitted that at the time of ac-
quisition of the site, they did not conduct an on-site inspection of the
property. However, the landowners contended that they did not have any
reason to do so according to the commercial practices at the time of ac-
quisition in 1969. 99 The court was unable to find that the defendants'
inaction was unreasonable because the Government had not presented
any evidence to conclude that the defendants' failure to inspect the prop-
erty or inquire into its previous environmental uses was inconsistent with
good commercial or customary practices at the time of acquisition."
93. Id. at 1347-48. See also Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988)
(contractual relationship exists between defendant and sublessee of defendant's subsidiary); United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988) (contractual relationship applies to a lease).
94. 706 F. Supp. 346. (M.D. Pa. 1988).
95. Id. at 348.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 350-51.
98. Id. at 352.
99. Id. at 353. But see the court's finding in Monsanto that the defendant site-owners' failure to
conduct a visual site inspection in the mid-1970s was "wilful or negligent blindness." United States
v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169.
100. United States v. Serafini, 706 F. Supp. 346, 353, & n.8.
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More significantly, the court did not agree with the Government's con-
tention that a property inspection by a potential landowner was a time-
honored or explicit component of the "all appropriate inquiry" obliga-
tion demanded by the defense. Instead, the court construed the inquiry
requirement as a flexible standard whose meaning is to evolve over time
with commercial practices in the real estate industry.101
A more recent transaction than that involved in Serafini was the
subject of In Re Sterling Steel Treating, Inc. 1o In that case, the defend-
ant purchased the site in 1987. Before acquisition, the defendant con-
ducted an on-site visual inspection of the property, but failed to inspect a
trailer located on the property."0 3 Hazardous wastes which had been
stored in the trailer were discovered after the defendant's acquisition of
the site. As the current owner, the defendant removed the wastes with
the approval of EPA."° The defendant subsequently withheld a portion
of the purchase price from the trustee in bankruptcy as reimbursement
for clean up costs involving the property.105 In the adversary proceeding
before the court, the defendant claimed exemption from CERCLA liabil-
ity based on the innocent landowner defense.
10 6
The court in In Re Sterling-Steel Treating, Inc. 107 ruled that when
the defendant purchased the property, he did have reason to know that
the property was contaminated with hazardous substances.108 The land-
owner failed to satisfy the requirement of lack of constructive knowledge
because he had engaged in business dealings with his predecessors, and
thus was aware of the "industrial uses" of the property." 9 In addition,
the defendant's inquiry before acquisition was insufficient in the court's
view because the defendant had not attempted to inspect the trailer lo-
cated on the property. 1 Although the defendant could not claim the
innocent landowner defense, the court applied equitable considerations
to allocate the extent of the parties' responsibilities for the removal
costs."' Ultimately, the court held that the response costs should be
101. Id. at 352-53.
102. 94 Bankr. 924 (E.D.Mi. 1989).
103. Id. at 926-27.
104. Id. at 927.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 929-30.
107. 94 Bankr. at 924.
108. Id. at 930.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 931.
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borne equally by the current owner and the bankrupt's estate.
112
The holding reached in Sterling Steel" 3 can be contrasted with the
result in a recent New York District Court decision. In International
Clinical Laboratories,Ina v. Stevens," 4 the court held that the current
owner was entitled to the innocent landowner defense."' According to
the court, the purchaser's on-site visual inspection of the property before
acquisition reasonably failed to disclose the presence of hazardous waste
at the site."' However, the purchaser continued to lease the property to
the same tenant who manufactured computer tape heads and had dis-
posed of hazardous wastes on the property." 7 While the tenant did not
dispose of any wastes after the purchaser acquired the property, it is just
as reasonable that the purchaser in International Clinical Laboratories
should have had the same suspicion of the presence of hazardous sub-
stances at the site based on its knowledge of the industrial uses of the
property that the purchaser possessed in Sterling Steel. In addition, the
hazardous substances in both cases were not obviously detectible by a
visual, on-site inspection of the respective properties." 8 Thus, the land-
owners were held to different standards of diligence in the two cases.
Current owners of commercial property acquired in arms-length
transactions are held to a more rigorous standard of due diligence under
the defense than innocent landowners who acquire such property in pri-
vate transactions. 19 In United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot,120 the
individual defendants acquired a property containing hazardous waste by
112. Id. The court applied the following equitable considerations: (1) doctrine of caveat emptor
whereby the purchaser bears the burden of any defect in the property and had the responsibility to
undertake a thorough inspection; (2) the "as-is" condition of the sale whereby the purchaser had
notice of its responsibilities in this regard; (3) the familiarity of the purchaser with the operations
conducted by its predecessor at the property whereby the purchaser should have suspected that
hazardous wastes may have been present and should have inspected the property as a result of those
suspicions; and (4) the trustee should have had knowledge concerning the conditions of the debtor's
assets. See also International Clinical Laboratories, Inc. v. Stevens, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3685
(1990) (innocent landowner is not liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA §§ 101(35)(A), 107(b)(3)
or according to equitable apportionment under CERCLA § 113(f)).
113. 94 Bankr. 924.
114. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3685 (1990).
115. Id.
116. Id. The environmental contamination existed as cesspools which over time had drained
into the groundwater at the site. Id.
117. Id.
118. See In re Sterling Steel, 94 Bankr. 924 (hazardous wastes present in trailer located on
property); Int'l Clinical Laboratories, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3685 (hazardous wastes present in
groundwater at property).
119. See In re Sterling Steel, 94 Bankr. 924, n.124.
120. 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989).
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inheriting stock which was later redeemed for ownership interests. 121
The court held that the defendants satisfied the innocent landowner de-
fense. First, the current owners had proven their lack of constructive
knowledge concerning the contamination based on their non-involve-
ment with the property, the non-obviousness of the contamination, and
their lack of specialized knowledge concerning the recycling operations
at the property.' 22 Second, even though the defendants conducted no
inquiry, such inaction was appropriate in this case because of the private
inheritance nature of the transaction. 123 The court further stated: "Con-
gress recognized that each case would be different and must be analyzed
on its facts."' 24
Overall, the courts have construed a standard of reasonableness
from the statutory language and applied such standard to the facts of
each case to determine whether the landowner fulfilled the inquiry obli-
gation of the innocent landowner defense. For current commercial trans-
actions, the statutory language identifies the following factors, which
implicitly include a visual inspection of the property, pertinent to the
landowner's lack of constructive knowledge after "all appropriate in-
quiry" into the property:
For purposes of establishing the defendant had no reason to know [of envi-
ronmental contamination] the court shall take into account:
(1) any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant,
(2) the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if
uncontaminated,
(3) commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the
property,
(4) the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at
the property, and
(5) the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection. 125
A landowner who acquires property in an arms-length, commercial
transaction bears a more rigorous obligation of inquiry than a landowner
who inherits the property or acquires it by private means such as a gift.
However, the precise scope of environmental due diligence for commer-
cial transactions remains statutorily and judicially ambiguous.
121. Id. at 1344-45.
122. Id. at 1348. •
123. Id. at 1348-49.
124. Id. at 1349. The court specified a "three-tier system" of obligation under the innocent
landowner defense based on its legislative history. "Commercial transactions are held to the strictest
standard; private transactions are given a little more leniency; and inheritances and bequests are
treated the most leniently of these three situations." Id. at 1348.
125. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B).
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In interpreting the innocent landowner defense, legal and real estate
practitioners provide a wide-range of advice concerning the parameters
of "all appropriate inquiry" to purchasers seeking exemption from liabil-
ity.126 Some commentators argue merely that the purchaser should con-
duct a walk-through site inspection.127 Others counsel that the
purchaser should conduct an "environmental due diligence audit" which
includes: an on-site inspection, interviews of site personnel, examination
of site documents and records, research into government records of the
site and tours of adjacent operations, surrounding locale and terrain.1 28
In short, CERCLA's requirement of reasonable inquiry is evolving in
practice into a substantial but ill-defined obligation of "environmental
due diligence."
As the real estate industry has hastened to comply with the defense's
standard of innocence based on lack of knowledge after inquiry, two
problems inherent in the CERCLA regime have been exposed. First, the
problem of legal uncertainty, ubiquitous in environmental liability,
129
pervades "all appropriate inquiry" because a purchaser of commercial
property must define the obligation for every transaction. Second, a
problem of practical irrelevance in claiming the defense occurs once the
purchaser complies with the statute by conducting an environmental in-
vestigation which reveals the presence of hazardous substances at the
site.
A. The Problem of Legal Uncertainty
The innocent landowner defense has generated widely discrepant
views as to what efforts are sufficient to fullill the obligation of inquiry
into the property.1 30 The courts have not substantively defined this re-
sponsibility other than by finding an implied standard of reasonableness
126. See generally Last, Superfund Liability Traps Affecting Developers and Lenders, 3 NAT.
REs. & EvN. 10 (Fall 1988) (as the centerpiece of hazardous materials liability minimization there
should be a sufficiently comprehensive site assessment); Anderson, supra note 99, at 539 (1987) ("at
least a minimal inspection will normally be required to dispel an inference of studied indifference");
Hayes & Dinlun, EnvironmentalLiability In RealProperty Transactions, 23 U. RICH. L. R. 349, 368-
69 (1989) (an appropriate environmental investigation includes an investigation review and a site
inspection; if necessary a Phase II investigation including media sampling should be performed).
127. See Anderson, supra note 87.
128. See DeMeester, Practical Guidance for Due Diligence Environmental Auditors, 18 Envtl. L.
Rep. 10210 (Envtl. L. Inst.) (1988).
129. See Abraham, supra note 1, for a discussion of the expansion of environmental liability in
the 1980s and the uncertainty of such liability as its central feature.
130. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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in the statutory language. 13
While the standard of environmental due diligence for the innocent
landowner currently is uncertain, this uncertainty partly results from
Congressional intent in enacting SARA. In the House floor debates,
Representative Frank, the sponsor of the innocent landowner defense,
stated that the buyer is under "some obligation to find out" whether en-
vironmental contamination exists at the site under the statute's construc-
tive knowledge requirement of a "diligent purchaser."' 132 In addition,
Representative Frank and other House members viewed the requirement
that the purchaser's investigation be consistent with good commercial
practice as an evolving standard that would become more stringent as the
public's awareness of environmental hazards increases over time. 13
If the environmental due diligence standard is one of reasonableness,
its scope must be determined on a case-by-case basis. As a resource-
intensive scheme, the imposing task of defining reasonableness in every
case consumes social resources of time, energy and money.13 4 More im-
portantly, such a task disrupts the lending and real estate markets by
threatening entities with extensive liability in the midst of legal uncer-
tainty.135 If the "specialized knowledge" of each defendant also is con-
sidered in the process of definition, commercial landowners will be held
to different standards of environmental diligence based on their respec-
tive expertise and resources.136
At a minimum, environmental due diligence under CERCLA re-
quires that a purchaser makes some type of pre-acquisition inquiry into
the property's condition to ascertain if hazardous substances are present
at the site.' 37 If such an assessment is viewed analogously to liability
131. See supra notes 88-124 and accompanying text.
132. 131 CONG. REc. H11159-68 (remarks of Rep. Frank).
133. See Hitt, supra note 8, at 18-19. In its recently issued Guidance, EPA characterized "all
appropriate inquiry" as a standard of reasonableness that would evolve over time with commercial
practices. The EPA noted its agreement with the House Conference Committee on SARA that the
"duty to inquire will be judged as of the time of acquisition; and that as public awareness of environ-
mental hazards increases, the burden of inquiry will increase concomitantly." Guidance, supra note
17, at 3504 (quoting Conference Report on SARA, H.R. 2005, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 187). How-
ever, the legislative history concerning this issue is contradictory. See 131 CoNG. REc. H 1157-68
(remarks of Rep. Breaux) (The innocent landowner defense was necessary to "really protect the
landowner who has not done anything to put the waste" at the property.).
134. See Note, Superfund Settlements, supra note 4. These costs do not include opportunity
costs, i.e., foregone environmental uses. See supra notes 28 and 29 and accompanying text.
135. See Abraham, supra note 1.
136. See Anderson, supra note 87, at 543-44; see also CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B).
137. For detailed discussion of the components of the environmental audit as the appropriate
method of evaluating environmental liabilities at acquisition, see Hitt, supra note 8, at 20-25.
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insurance for the innocent landowner, the benefits of investigation
(avoidance of CERCLA liability) may outweigh its costs (time and
money needed to conduct the inquiry). Under the current scheme, the
vague contours of "all appropriate inquiry" undermine the potential "in-
surance" benefits of the innocent landowner's investigation because ex-
emption from liability cannot be assured when statutory compliance is
uncertain.13 Thus, CERCLA's due diligence requirement reflects the
various problems accompanying the expansion of environmental liability
in the 1980s: uncertain liability, lack of insurability, and the potential
discouragement of real estate transfer and development. 139
B. The Problem of Practical Irrelevance
If a purchaser of real property conducts an environmental assess-
ment of the site, the presence of hazardous substances will most likely be
revealed. 1" If the purchaser then moves ahead with the acquisition, she
cannot qualify for the innocent landowner defense because she has actual
knowledge of environmental contamination at the property.
According to one commentator, the innocent landowner defense
suggests that the only way to minimize liability in acquiring the contami-
nated land is to investigate, but not "thoroughly enough to gain actual
knowledge of non-obvious hazardous substances." '141 However, this type
of investigation distorts the aim of CERCLA to promote the efficient
identification and cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites. Thus, if a
landowner exercises due diligence in a pre-acquisition inquiry into the
property, the protection from liability may be short-lived or even non-
existent.142 If Congressional intent was to provide an exemption from
liability for innocent parties, in fact little protection is available regard-
less of the purchaser's efforts at environmental investigation.143 More
importantly, the irrelevance of the innocent landowner defense in prac-
tice may discourage the performance of such investigation and encourage
indemnification agreements, thereby eradicating the informational bene-
fits that environmental investigation brings to the CERCLA process.
138. See Abraham, supra note 1, discussing the characteristics of the "new environmental liabil-
ity" and its relationship to the insurance market.
139. Id. at 942-45.
140. Hitt, supra note 8, at 26.
141. Anderson, supra note 87, at 543.
142. Hitt, supra note 8, at 3.
143. Schwenke, supra note 8, at 10361.
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IV. THE RISING STANDARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DILIGENCE:
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE INNOCENT
LANDOWNER DEFENSE
Legislation concerning the innocent landowner defense currently is
pending before Congress. Entitled "The Innocent Landowner Defense
Amendment," 1" the proposed bill amends CERCLA by clarifying the
"all appropriate inquiry" standard.145 The Innocent Landowner Defense
Amendment (hereinafter "the Amendment") creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that an innocent purchaser who follows the specified guidelines
of the Amendment has satisfied the requirements of the CERCLA de-
fense, and is thus exempt from liability. 46 The scope of the pre-acquisi-
tion investigation set out in the Amendment, while based on CERCLA's
innocent landowner defense, extends far beyond the reasonable inquiry
and visual inspection components of the statutory defense. The Amend-
ment requires all purchasers to conduct a "Phase I" property investiga-
tion that includes:
(1) a Chain of Title review, including a review of deeds, leases, easements
and documents of record, and a review of historical data such as maps
and aerial photographs to identify prior ownership and uses which rep-
resent a potential threat of contamination of the property;
(2) a review of reasonably ascertainable public information, including gov-
ernment records to identify regulated hazardous waste sites and re-
corded hazardous site conditions reported by federal, state and local
agencies;
(3) a site inspection and assessment by an environmental engineer, coordi-
nated with the foregoing information search, to investigate observable
site conditions which indicate the presence or likely presences of con-
tamination on the property.147
144. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CoNG. REc. E2367-68 (1989).
145. 135 CoNa. REc. E2367, (daily ed. June 28, 1989) (statement of Rep. Weldon).
146. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § (2)(C9(i)(1989).
147. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § (2)(1989) provides in full:
SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO SUPERFUND PERTAINING TO INNOCENT
LANDOWNER DEFENSE.
Section 101(35) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) is amended by redesignating subparagraphs (C)
and (D) as subparagraphs (D) and (E), respectively and inserting after subparagraph (B),
the following:
(C) (i) A defendant who has acquired real property shall have established a rebuttal
presumption that he has made all appropriate inquiry within the meaning of subpara-
graph (B) if he establishes that, immediately prior to or at the item [sic] of acquisition, he
obtained a Phase I Environmental Audit of the real property which meets the require-
ments of this subparagraph.
(ii) For purposes of this subparagraph, the term 'environmental professional' means
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In short, the Amendment mandates an environmental investigation
which imposes a substantial and specific obligation of due diligence upon
innocent landowners. The Amendment requires every purchaser in-
volved in a commercial real estate transaction to hire a professional envi-
an individual, or an entity managed or controlled by such individual, who, through aca-
demic training, occupational experience and reputation (such as engineers, environmen-
tal consultants and attorneys), can objectively conduct one or more aspects of a Phase I
Environmental Audit. for purposes of this subparagraph, the term 'Phase I Environ-
mental Audit' means an investigation of the real property, conducted by environmental
professionals, to determine or discover the obviousness of the presence or likely presence
of a release or threatened release of hazardous substances on the real property and which
consists of a review of each of the following sources of information concerning the previ-
ous ownership and uses of the real property:
(I) Recorded chain of title documents regarding the real property, including all
deeds, easements, leases, restrictions, and covenants for a period of 50 years.
(H1) Aerial photographs which may reflect prior uses of the real property and which
are reasonably obtainable through State or local government agencies.
(III) Determination of the existence of recorded environmental cleanup liens against
the real property which have arises [sic] pursuant to Federal, State, and local
statutes.
(IV) Reasonably obtainable Federal, State, and local government records of sites or
facilities where there has been a release or hazardous substances and which are
likely to cause or contribute to a release or threatened release of hazardous sub-
stances on the real property, including investigation reports for such sites or
facilities; reasonably obtainable Federal, State, and local government environ-
mental records of activities likely to cause or contribute to a release or a
threatened release of hazardous substances on the real property, including land-
fill and other disposal location records, underground storage tank records, haz-
ardous waste handler and generator records and spill reporting records, and
such other reasonably obtainable Federal, State, and local government environ-
mental records which report incidents or activities which are likely to cause or
contribute to a release or threatened release of hazardous substances on the real
property. In order to be deemed 'reasonably obtainable' within the meaning of
this subclause, a copy or reasonable facsimile of the record must be obtainable
from the government agency by request.
(V) A visual site inspection of the real property and all facilities and improvements
on the real property, and a visual inspection of immediately adjacent properties
from the real property, including an investigation of any chemical use, storage,
treatment and disposal practices on the property.
(iii) No presumption shall arise under clause (i) unless the defendant has maintained
a compilation of the information reviewed in the course of the Phase I Environmental
Audit.
(iv) Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, if the Phase I Environ-
mental Audit discloses the presence or likely presence of a release or threatened release
of hazardous substances on the real property to be acquired, no presumption shall arise
under clause (i) with respect to such release or threatened release unless the defendant
has taken reasonable steps, in accordance with current technology available, existing
regulations, and generally acceptable engineering practices, as may be necessary to con-
firm the absence of such release or threatened release.
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ronmental consultant to conduct a fairly comprehensive inquiry into the
past and present environmental condition of the site.148 Furthermore, if
the "Phase I" investigation discloses the presence or likely presence of
hazardous substances at the property, the Amendment appears to man-
date a "Phase II" audit involving soil and water testing. 149
The Amendment's "Phase I" environmental audit may have already
become incorporated into current real estate practice. Although it is dif-
ficult to estimate how many entities currently conduct a comprehensive
site assessment before purchasing property, practice manuals indicate
that this type of environmental investigation is widely sought by purchas-
ers and lenders concerned with avoiding CERCLA's broad liability. 150
According to its sponsor, the Amendment provides a "narrow exemption
from strict liability to innocent landowners as an incentive for them to
investigate the environmental condition of real property prior to acquisi-
tion."1'' The aim of the Amendment is to facilitate the two main goals
of CERCLA - to efficiently clean up inactive hazardous waste sites and
insure that those responsible for the contamination pay for such
cleanup."5 2 The proposed legislation promotes the efficient cleanup of
hazardous wastes by requiring purchasers to generate necessary informa-
tion concerning the conditions of properties across the nation. 153 In ad-
dition, such essential information concerning the past and present uses of
the property aids in the identification of parties responsible for the site's
hazardous condition. Overall, the Amendment not only promotes the
goals of CERCLA in clarifying the innocent landowner defense, but also
creates a positive statutory duty of environmental due diligence.
The Amendment also provides legal certainty which fulfills an insur-
ance purpose and facilitates real estate transfer and development. Parties
to a transaction who possess certainty regarding their respective liabili-
148. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (1989). The environmental audit, as the basis of
environmental due diligence, generally is defined as a process of data collection and site visits con-
ducted pursuant to a contractual relationship that enables a buyer to assess the environmental condi-
tion of the land, physical assets, and operations being purchased, so that the buyer can manage or
avoid the risks of environmental liability presented by the acquisition. Demester, supra note 128, at
10211. See generally Mays, A Practical Guide to Environmental Due Diligence in Real Estate Trans.
actions (1989) (unpublished manuscript).
149. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(C)(iv) (1989).
150. Most practitioners counsel purchasers to take investigatory steps similar to those specified
by the Amendments Phase I audit. See, eg., Demeester, supra note 128; Mays, supra note 148; Hitt,
supra note 8; Hayes & Dinlun, supra note 126.
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ties are able to quantify and allocate the risks in structuring the transac-
tion."' In the typically debt-heavy structure of commercial real estate
acquisitions, many transactions are forced to fold if environmental
problems possessing uncertain risks arise before the transaction closes."'
The current absence of established standards upsets environmentally
risky transactions in which the only recourse for a purchaser is either to
abandon the transaction, thereby undermining productivity, or to enter
into costly and protracted litigation which further consumes social
resources.
The enactment of the Amendment considerably narrows the issues
with respect to the defense's inquiry requirement while preserving the
incentive to avoid CERCLA liability. More importantly, the Amend-
ment facilitates the goals of CERCLA and promotes real estate develop-
ment by providing legal certainty to the transaction. In specifying the
due diligence obligation, the Amendment also allows the innocent land-
owner to use the defense as a type of private insurance against environ-
mental liability. Overall, the Amendment alleviates the inherent
CERCLA problem of legal uncertainty.15 6 Although the rebuttable pre-
sumption does not apply if the audit indicates a possibility of contamina-
tion at the property, the Amendment requires the landowner to confirm
the absence of such contamination by further investigation. 57 While this
requirement does not resolve the problem of practical irrelevance once
hazardous wastes are discovered at the property, the landowner must
investigate thoroughly enough to confirm the presence or absence of con-
tamination at the site. Thus, by mandating thorough investigations, the
Amendment transforms the statutory defense into a substantial positive
duty of environmental due diligence for every transaction.158
154. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 945-60, discussing the quantification of risks by insurers as a
form of "surrogate regulation" in the environmental field." Id. at 954.
155. See Mays, supra note 148. An explicit requirement in the proposed Amendment for a
Phase II resource-testing audit when the Phase I audit discloses the likely presence of hazardous
wastes would provide even greater certainty notwithstanding increased costs to the purchaser desir-
ous of escaping CERCLA liability.
156. See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
158. This result does not appear to negate claims that the landowner's inquiry was negligent in
some way; however, the burden of proof of such claim would be placed on the Government or
another private party because the landowner who complies with the Amendment's requirements has
a rebuttable presumption of appropriate inquiry. See H.R. 2787 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § (2)(C)(i)
(1989).
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V. THE RISING STANDARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DILIGENCE:
EPA'S SETTLEMENT POLICY
EPA's "Guidance On Landowner Liability And De Mininis Settle-
ments," (Guidance) was issued on June 6, 1989.159 Like the Amend-
ment, the Guidance implicitly establishes the due diligence standard as
an obligation accompanying all real estate transactions." ° According to
EPA, the Guidance is designed to enable the Government to offer liabil-
ity settlements to those landowners who qualify for the innocent land-
owner defense, but who do not want to risk a trial on the issue or incur
litigation costs. 161 Settlements minimally require access to the site and
assurances of due care from the innocent landowner, but may also in-
volve a cash payment in some circumstances. 162 A de minimis settlement
allows a PRP meeting certain requirements to resolve liability as quickly
as possible, thereby reducing its costs and freeing the Government to use
its resources for cleanup and the pursuit of other PRPs.163
The Guidance delineates EPA's viewpoint concerning the connec-
tion between the innocent landowner defense and CERCLA's de minimis
landowner provision. 16 For innocent landowners, the Government will
only entertain a de minimis settlement proposal pursuant to CERCLA
159. Guidance, supra note 17.
160. Id. at 3505.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 3505-3506.
163. Id.
164. SARA, 42 U.S.C. 9622(g), provides that de minimis contributors are liable for response
costs, but such persons are entitled to favorable settlement treatment. See Leifer & Musiker, supra
note 21. CERCLA § 112(g), specifically provides:
(g) De minimis settlements
(1) Expedited final settlement
Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as determined by the Presi-
dent, the President shall as promptly as possible reach a final settlement with a
potentially responsible party in an administrative or civil action under section
9606 or 9607 of this title if such settlement involves only a minor portion of the
response costs at the facility concerned and, in the judgment of the President,
the conditions in either of the following subparagraph (A) or (B) are met:
(A) Both of the following are minimal in comparison to other hazardous sub-
stances at the facility:
(i) The amount of the hazardous substances contributed by that party to
the facility.
(ii) The toxic or other hazardous effects of the substances contributed by
that party to the facility.
(B) The potentially responsible party-
(i) is the owner of the real property on or in which the facility is located;
(ii) did not conduct or permit the generation, transportation, storage, treat-
ment, or disposal of any hazardous substance at the facility; and
19901 CERCLA'S INNOCENT LANDOWNER DEFENSE 853
§ 122(g)(1)(B) based upon the defense's requirement that the landowner
has made "all appropriate inquiry" into the property before acquisi-
tion.16 Before settling as de minimis contributor, the current owner
must prove to the Government's satisfaction that her investigation into
the property fulfilled the requirements of the innocent landowner de-
fense. 66 Thus, EPA's approach is to read together the innocent land-
owner defense and the de minimis provision of CERCLA.167
The Guidance's critical omission is its failure to address the question
of what constitutes "all appropriate inquiry" according to EPA.1 68 In-
stead, the Guidance merely reiterates the courts' interpretation of dili-
gent inquiry as "what is reasonable under all of the circumstances."'169
Despite this failing, EPA's Guidance does assure the pervasiveness of
environmental due diligence in real estate transactions by incorporating
the obligation into the CERCLA settlement process. The landowner
bears the "burden of coming forward with information establishing his
eligibility for a de minimis settlement" as an inmftent landowner.170 The
information to be generated by the landowner parallels the environmen-
tal inquiry to be conducted by purchasers under the Amendment: the
landowner must demonstrate her lack of actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the environmental contamination at the time of acquisition based
on information regarding the environmental copdition and previous uses
of the property. While the Amendment specifies the innocent land-
owner's obligation of due diligence more clearly,' 71 EPA's Guidance also
forecasts a rising standard of environmental due diligence for the land-
owner involved in CERCLA settlements.
(ill) did not contribute to the release or threat of release of a hazardous
substance at the facility thr6ulh any'action or omission.
This subparagraph (B) does not aply it the potentially responsible
party purchased the real property with actual, or constructive knowl-
edge that the property was used for the generation, transportation, stor-
age, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous substance.
Id.
165. Guidance, supra note 17, at 3503. •
166. See id. at 3505-06.
167. See O'Brien, supra note 60 (criticizing the EPA's apprpach as a trafned interpretation of
the two statutory provisions). See also Leifer & Musiker, supra note 21, (suggesting that
§ 122(g)(1)(B) should be eliminated because it is redundant in light of the innocent landowner
defense).
168. See Schwenke, supra note 8, at 1036.
169. Guidance, supra, note 17, at 3505.
170. Id.
171. See supra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
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VI. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DILIGENCE
STANDARD
The issue of whether the obligation of environmental due diligence
for innocent landowners is fair or efficient is a policy debate concerning
who ultimately bears responsibility for the cost of cleaning up industrial
society's hazardous residues. CERCLA's goals of prompt cleanup of
sites, recovery of government costs from responsible parties and protec-
tion of public health and the environment currently are accomplished
through a legal liability regime. CERCLA attempts to allocate the social
costs of inactive hazardous waste sites to responsible parties, i.e., those
who have profited in the past from unsafe disposal practices. 172 In 1986
SARA effected a broader-based private apportionment of the costs of
Government response and remediation activities than that originally en-
acted through the Superfund tax.173 Under the present scheme, CER-
CLA's joint and several strict liability reaches even innocent purchasers
who bear no responsibility for the creation or maintenance of hazardous
conditions on real property.17 4
The innocent landowner defense and its concurrent rising duty of
environmental due diligence are inextricably tied to the CERCLA liabil-
ity regime. This inflexible and expansive enforcement scheme currently
creates enormous transaction and opportunity costs for dispute resolu-
tion by relying on the judicial system to define the legal parameters of
due diligence.175 As an integral component of the innocent landowner
defense, the rising obligation of environmental due diligence must be
evaluated in terms of the overall goals of CERCLA and the social policy
values of efficiency and fairness.
Environmental due diligence promotes CERCLA's goals of rapid
cleanup and government reimbursement from responsible parties by low-
ering the costs of the CERCLA enforcement process. The obligation re-
quires innocent landowners to generate essential information concerning
the environmental condition of a particular property, the presence of
hazardous substances at that property and the previous ownership and
172. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
173. See Note, Superfund Settlements supra note 4.
174. See supra notes 31-74 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see generally Developments, supra note 77, at
1466; Lyons, supra note 1, at 272 ("The substantial transaction costs which arise from the govern-
ment's efforts to have responsible parties bear site cleanup costs in effect impose enormous but un-
seen opportunity costs on society by shifting resources which might have been used to finance
cleanup efforts to the process of imposing legal and financial responsibility for cleanup costs on
responsible parties.").
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uses of the property.1 76 The innocent landowner must provide such doc-
umentation to EPA in order to obtain a release from liability as a de
minimis contributor in a CERCLA settlement concerning the prop-
erty. 177 The obligation thus encourages early settlement of liability and
efficient cleanup by providing historical and current information neces-
sary to apportion liability among the PRPs and remove the environmen-
tal contamination from the site.
The innocent landowner also must provide such environmental in-
formation in claiming the innocent landowner defense under CERCLA
§ 107(b)(3)/101(35). Although the efficiency goals of CERCLA are
more attenuated in the litigation context, due diligence facilitates this
process by providing factual evidence to determine responsibility for the
creation of hazardous waste contamination. The environmental informa-
tion arising from the exercise of diligent inquiry thus lowers the transac-
tion and opportunity costs of the CERCLA enforcement process by
facilitating the allocation of responsibility among the PRPs connected
with the investigated property in both settlement and adjudication.
These informational benefits of due diligence are attainable if the pro-
posed Amendment 17 is enacted because the legislation clarifies the due
diligence obligation and requires specific environmental information con-
cerning every property acquisition. Under the current statutory stan-
dard, much of the information deemed essential would not be generated
because the scope of the inquiry requirement is uncertain. 79
Overall, the innocent landowner defense provides societal benefits
by requiring, through due diligence, the generation of essential environ-
mental information. However, the defense does not effectively discour-
age the unabated transfer of contaminated property by threatening sellers
of real estate with the purchaser's investigation of the property. °80 The
latter benefit is both illusory and inefficient under CERCLA. It is illu-
sory because most purchasers will simply seek a contractual right of con-
tribution or indemnification from the seller at the time of transfer in the
future event of a response action involving the property.' Such a con-
176. See supra notes 148-170; see also 135 CONG. REc. E2367, (daily ed. June 28, 1989) (state-
ment of Rep. Weldon discussing the purpose of the Amendment as facilitating environmental
cleanup by providing information about the conditions at particular sites).
177. Guidance, supra note 17, at 3505; see supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
178. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
179. See supra notes 88-129 and accompanying text.
180. See Levine, Hazardous Waste Product As A Constraint On the Development of Real Prop-
erty, in HANDLING LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS OF REAL ESTATE 193 (1988).
181. The contribution option certainly is available to the innocent purchaser. However, due
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tractual provision is allowed by CERCLA18 2 and is less costly for both
parties. The purchaser does not add the cost of the seller's cleanup effort
or her own investigation to the price of the property, and the seller is not
required to incur the cost of remediating the site before transfer.
A more efficient method than the innocent landowner defense of en-
couraging the seller to clean up contaminated property is that used in the
Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act (ECRA) of New
Jersey. 83 Under ECRA, the seller may only offer property for transfer
that is free from environmental contamination. 84 The ECRA scheme is
more efficient than CERCLA because ECRA assures that every property
offered for transfer is uncontaminated, and cleanup is not delayed by an
indemnification agreement between the parties.
With the enactment of the Amendment, environmental due dili-
gence provides a priVate'benefit to innocent purchasers of real estate.
Clarification of diligent environmental inquiry allows innocent landown-
ers to conduct productive enterprises in a context of greater legal cer-
tainty.185 The cost of enironmental due diligence borne by the innocent
landowner may be viewed as a type of private insurance against future
environmental liability. However, if the due diligence obligation is to
become an integral and effective component of every commercial real es-
tate acquisition, the costs of this pervasive, daily obligation must be re-
diligence allows the purchaser to enter into indemnification agreements with knowledge of the envi-
ronmental condition of a property and assures purchasers of statutory exemption from liability if
contamination is later discovered on the property. Most likely, the innocent purchaser would not
forego due diligence for a right of contribution in these circumstances because the environmental
investigation is less costly than litigating the contribution action and risking joint and several strict
liability as a PRP.
182. See SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9113(f). See also supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
183. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:lk-6, 13:lk-13 (1983). Under ECRA, the current owner is re-
quired to remove hazardous substances from industrial property before the property can be sold or
transferred. This obligation is triggered by various real estate and commercial transactions, not by
the endangerment or threat to the environment standard under CERCLA. See SARA 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607. For a discussion of obligations of the seller under ECRA, see Understanding ECRA Regula-
tions, 19 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1671 (1988).
184. The seller, prior to sale, must:
(1) provide a sworn declaration that there are no hazardous wastes on her property or that any
past discharges have been cleaned up to appropriate Department of Environmental Protec-
tion (DEP) Standards, (2) where hazardous waste contamination exists, follow a detailed
cleanup plan and insure the funds to clean up the property, or (3) enter into a detailed DEP
"Administrative Consent Order."
Levine, supra note 180 at 212-13; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lk-9(b).
185. The encouragement of productivity and development provided by legal certainty could also
be viewed as a public benefit of the due diligence obligation. However, by "public benefit," I am
referring to the benefits to society defined by the goals of CERCLA, especially the aim of efficient
cleanup of environmental contamination from inactive hazardous waste sites.
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duced by the legal certainty of the Amendment. i8 6  Notwithstanding
the private benefit due diligence provides to landowners, the issue of
whether due diligence is fairly imposed on innocent parties appears to be
irrelevant given the extensive liability and pervasiveness of the CERCLA
regime. 17 The obligation is a mechanism which further privatizes the
costs of the CERCLA enforcement process by reducing the Govern-
ment's actual and transaction costs. Although Congress effected a
broader-based apportionment of costs through SARA, the fairness con-
cerns with environmental due diligence are diminished by increasing the
efficiency of the obligation through legal certainty with the enactment of
the Amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION
The innocent landowner who conducts a diligent inquiry into a
property's environmental condition has performed a valuable service to
the Government, other PRPs and the public by freeing social resources
from CERCLA consumption to be used for additional environmental
cleanup tasks. As environmental due diligence evolves into the substan-
tial obligation that is forecasted by the Amendment' and EPA's Gui-
dance,8 9 this savings in social resources should be recognized in the
CERCLA regime, especially in the increasing use of the settlement pro-
cess' 90 and in the exploration of alternatives to CERCLA's liability
scheme such as mixed funding.' 9'
Environmental due diligence privatizes the costs of the CERCLA
program and benefits the public by facilitating the prompt solution of the
problems posed by inactive hazardous waste sites. Because environmen-
tal due diligence provides significant benefits both privately and publicly,
the obligation is fairly imposed as long as these benefits are recognized in
186. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
187. "CERCLA's liability system primarily operates to further the goal of compensation" of the
Government. Note, Deep Pockets and CERCLA, supra note 174, at 309. This compensation justifi-
cation of CERCLA's liability provisions is consistent with a fairness justification for the innocent
landowner defense, i.e. the due diligence obligation is fairly imposed on innocent parties because it
furthers the process of Government compensation.
188. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
189. Guidance, supra note 17 (1989).
190. See Lyons, supra note 1, at 332-44 (exploring the viability of alternatives to the CERCLA
liability regime); Note, Superfund Settlements, supra note 4 (discussing the alternatives of EPA fund-
ing for "orphan shares" at sites, non-binding preliminary assessments, and PRP participation in
remedial investigation/feasibility studies to remove obstacles to prompt settlements).
191. See generally Comment, The Environmental Due Diligence Defense and Contractual Pro-
tection Devices, supra note 11; H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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the CERCLA regime and the costs of the obligation are decreased by the
legal certainty of the Amendment. A defined standard of environmental
due diligence contributes to a heightened environmental awareness and
aids in future decision-making concerning the preservation of an essential.
resource.
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